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MASS aviation accidents have become an unfortunate
by-product of modern technological society. As the
cost of air travel decreases, more people are choosing air
travel as a preferred mode of transportation; it is esti-
mated that the number of passengers who board planes
will double to more than two billion by the year 2000.1 In
addition, aircraft are aging faster than they can be re-
placed. The average age of the United States aircraft fleet
is 12.7 years, and the most elderly commercial aircraft are
over 24 years of age.2 The increase in air traffic, coupled
with the aging of U.S. aircraft fleets, no doubt enhances
the risk of more major air accidents occurring.
Mass aviation disasters, like other mass tort claims, have
many similarities: they result in the filing of many suits
which produce mounds of paperwork; they produce high
litigation costs for both plaintiffs and defendants; they
take up significant amounts of time requiring duplicative
effort and, as a result, they affect other potential users of
the judicial system.3 Clearly, the use of separate litigation
I Ramirez, How Safe Are You in the Air?, FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at 75.
2 Id. The average age of the world fleet is 11.7 years. Id.
I Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429 (1986); see also,
Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 AM.
U.L. REV. 299, 304 (1969) (arguing that the present system of mass tort litigation
results in unnecessarily high costs and proposing expanded federal jurisdiction
over aviation disaster cases and new substantive federal tort law for such cases).
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to resolve numerous similar claims arising from a single
mass air disaster involves an enormous amount of waste.
The use of federal class action suits to litigate these
claims would serve to eliminate this inefficiency while pro-
ducing several correlative benefits. Both plaintiffs and de-
fendants would benefit from a reduction in legal fees,4 a
larger number of shared expert witnesses, and broader,
more effective discovery.5 Plaintiffs would enjoy more
equal bargaining power with the defendants because class
counsel could speak for them.6 Defendants would be able
to develop a clearer estimate of their economic exposure
for settlement purposes, and they arguably might even be
willing to provide higher settlements since their costs will
be reduced by consolidated litigation.7 Class actions
would also impose a lighter burden on nonparties affected
by the suit, such as witnesses and other litigants seeking
access to the courts.8 Finally, multiple adjudications pose
the risk of inconsistent outcomes from identical fact situa-
tions; some plaintiffs may recover while others may not.
Such inconsistent results should not be tolerated in ajudi-
cial system based on parity of treatment.
Given the numerous advantages of class actions, it
seems odd that the judiciary has been so reluctant to cer-
tify class actions in mass air accidents. 9 Recognized fed-
See Note, Class Action-Mass Accident Litigation, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 320, 331
(1974). Plaintiffs could retain a greater portion of any judgment or settlement,
since attorney's fees are determined by the court instead of on a contingent basis.
Id.
Comment, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1983).
,i 3 H. NEWBURG, NEWBURG ON CLAss ACTIONs at 368 (2d ed. 1985). This bene-
fit offers protection to plaintiffs with small or insubstantial claims who may not
otherwise be able to sue. Id.
7Id.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1144.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083,
1087 (9th Cir. 1975) (court of appeals decertified class action suit brought on
behalf of the next of kin of 385 passengers killed in the crash of a McDonnell
Douglas DC-10 airplane near Paris, France), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Mar-
chesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (class action
certification denied in an action against airline and aircraft manufacturer arising
from crash of airplane which resulted in the death of 107 passengers and six crew
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eral procedure scholars have continually suggested that
class actions are especially appropriate in the litigation of
claims arising from mass accidents.' 0 The purpose of this
comment is to address some of the issues surrounding the
use of class action suits in mass air disaster litigation. The
comment will first address the scope of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, which provides for the maintenance of
federal class action suits." It will then address the various
factors surrounding the prevailing judicial hesitancy to
certify class actions in mass air disaster litigation. 12 Fi-
nally, it will analyze several alternative methods of adjudi-
cation that the courts have used in mass air disaster
cases,' 3 and it will suggest that the class action, despite its
limitations, is ultimately a superior method of litigating
the numerous claims which arise out of a mass air
disaster. '4
members); Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (certification denied in class action arising from crash of airplane in
Indonesia where only 17 of the 96 passengers killed were Americans and only two
decedents were residents of Virginia, where the suit was brought); Hobbs v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (certification denied in
class action suit arising from crash of an airplane near Hanover, New Hampshire
in which none of the potential class members, other than the named plaintiffs, had
any connection with Pennsylvania, and where it was highly unlikely that any eye-
witnesses or even key expert witnesses would find the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania a convenient forum).
10 [A] mass accident appears particularly appropriate for class
treatment. Indeed, the question of liability to all those injured in a
plane or train cash is more likely to be uniform than that of liability
for manipulation of the price of securities; with the introduction of
such large scale public transportation facilities as the "jumbo jets,"
the ability to determine liability for an accident in one proceeding
will be even more desirable.
3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.45[3], at 23-811 n.35 (2d ed.
1969); "The argument for class action treatment is. particularly strong in cases
arising out of mass disasters such as an airplane crash in which there is little
chance of individual defenses being presented." 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1783, at 75 (2d ed. 1986).
11 See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 96-130 and accompanying text.
' See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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II. SCOPE OF FEDERAL RULE 23
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides the proce-
dural guidelines necessary for the maintenance of a fed-
eral class action suit. 5 Rule 23 was designed to achieve
efficiencies of time, effort and expense in cases involving
,5 Rule 23 provides:
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typ-
ical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class could create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the in-
terest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION TO BE
MAINTAINED; NOTICE; JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED PARTIALLY AS
CLASS ACTIONS.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be
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numerous parties. 16 In order to obtain certification, fed-
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practi-
cable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The no-
tice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance
through counsel.
(3) the judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(l) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be mem-
bers of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice
provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not re-
quested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class,
and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
(d) ORDERS IN CONDUCT OF ACTIONS. In the conduct of actions
to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all
of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on
intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elimi-
nate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar pro-
cedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from
time to time.
(e) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and no-
tice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
- FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee to the
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eral class actions must meet the four requirements of Rule
23(a) and fit within one of the three categories of Rule
23(b).
The circumstances surrounding mass aviation disasters
easily satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a).' 7 First, the
parties are usually numerous and often reside in many dif-
ferent states, so joinder is impracticable.' 8 Second, since
"all of the claimants are harmed by a sudden, instantane-
ous, and centrally located occurrence,"' 9 common ques-
tions of fact and law necessarily exist, minimizing the
possibility of diverse theories of recovery among claim-
ants or individual defenses to liability among defend-
ants.20  Third, because all class members are seeking
1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 stated that "[slubdivision
(b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies
of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about unde-
sirable results." Id.
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
19 See Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1615, 1624 (1972).
One commentator implies thatjoinder will be impracticable in most mass accident
situations since there are usually over 100 plaintiffs. Id. "Impracticable" does not
mean "impossible," however. The representatives of the proposed class need
only show that it is "extremely difficult or inconvenient to join all the members of
the class." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1762, at 159; see
also Sala v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(class certification granted in action brought by railroad passengers who were in-
jured when an Amtrak train collided with a railroad maintenance vehicle).
11, Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions. A Step Toward Equity & Efficiency, 47
ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1190 (1983). For instance, an airplane crash would present the
same liability questions for each passenger, even though the damages would de-
pend on individual circumstances. See also In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
996 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the court stated:
Determination of the liability issues in one suit may represent a sub-
stantial savings in time and resources. Even if the action thereafter
"degenerates" into a series of individual damage suits, the result
nevertheless works an improvement over the situation in which the
same separate suits require adjudication on liability using the same
evidence over and over again .... If economies can be achieved by
use of the class device, then its application must be given serious and
sympathetic consideration. . . . In short, the trend has been for
courts to be more receptive to use of the class action in mass tort
litigation.
Id. at 1009-10.
21) See Comment, supra note 19, at 1191. It has been suggested that "in the typi-
cal mass accident situation .... the facts pertaining to liability will not differ mean-
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compensatory damages for similar injuries caused by the
same accident, the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties will normally be typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class. 2' Finally, the representative parties
should fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class so long as they have experienced counsel, resources
to endure protracted litigation, and a substantial stake in
the litigation, such that they will vigorously litigate the ac-
tion to the fullest. 22
Once the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied, the class must obtain certification under one of
the three provisions of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(1), the
"prejudice" class action provision, authorizes class action
certification if some prejudice would result to any party if
members of the class were required to litigate their claims
in a series of individual actions and the resulting prejudice
can be obviated by using a class action.23 This provision
has been applied successfully in a few mass accident
cases 24, but most courts refuse to use it in such a
ingfully from one individual to another and there is little or no likelihood of
individual defenses to liability." Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident
Litigation, 23 Lov. L. REv. 383, 389 (1977).
2' Comment, supra note 18, at 1619. A plaintiff's claim is typical if it "arises
from the same event or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other
class members and is based on the same legal theory." In re School Asbestos
Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd in part, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
1986).
22 See Comment, supra note 18, at 1619. "The difficulties of assessing these fac-
tors are no greater in mass accident class actions than in class actions generally."
Id. "Adequate representation depends on two factors: (a) the [representative]
plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct
the proposed litigation, and (b) the [representative] plaintiff must not have inter-
ests antagonistic to those of the class." Sala, 120 F.R.D. at 498.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 762, 789, (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
24 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 562 (S.D. Fla.
1973) (class action certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (c)(4)(A) on
behalf of cruise ship passengers who became ill after being exposed to contami-
nated food or water while on board the ship), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.
1975); In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (class action certified
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) on behalf of all persons
having a right to be compensated as a result of a midair collision); see also Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 1153.
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context.2 5
The "prejudice" provision contains two separate
clauses. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) permits certification of a class
action where necessary to avoid creating a risk of incom-
patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class. This portion of the rule was designed to avoid in-
consistent rulings in identical fact situations. 26 In McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court,2 7 the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the "incompatible standards of con-
duct" language of subdivision (b)(1)(A) to be the incom-
patible standards of conduct required of the defendant in
fulfilling judgments in separate actions. 28 In separate tri-
2.5 Comment, supra note 5, at 1153; compare McDonnell Douglas, 523 F.2d at 1085
(court of appeals expressly rejected Hernandez and Gabel, and decertified a class
action brought on behalf of the next of kin of 385 passengers killed in the crash of
a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airplane near Paris, France), with In re Agent Orange,
506 F. Supp. at 789 (court refused to certify class action under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(l)(A) or (b)(l)(B), but agreed to certify class action under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) on behalf of a class of individuals claiming injuries as a result of exposure
to the chemical "Agent Orange" during the Vietnam War), and Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979) (court refused to certify action
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(l)(A) or (b)(l)(B), but agreed to certify class action
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3) on behalf of a class of all Massachusetts women
exposed to DES in utero).
Two recent mass accident certification cases have been overturned. However,
neither appellate court forbade certification completely. See In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1184 (8th Cir.) (court of appeals held that the district court
erred in certifying class action on issues of liability and punitive damages under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A) and 23(b)(l)(B) on behalf of a class of persons injured
as a result of the collapse of a hotel skywalk where the class action effectively
prevented the class members from settling actions that were already pending in
state court), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d
847, 857 (9th Cir. 1982) (court of appeals held that lower court erred in certifying
a nationwide punitive damage class under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) on behalf of
class of women injured by using the Dalkon Shield where the court did not give
out-of-state plaintiffs an opportunity to participate in prior briefings or hearings,
and without establishing as a fact that Robins' assets were too limited to permit
conventional litigation), cert.-denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
- See Comment supra note 5, at 1154.
27 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
28 Id. at 1086; see also La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th
Cir. 1973), where the court of appeals decertified a class action brought by plain-
tiff against all pawn brokers licensed to do business in Oregon on behalf of all
customers who suffered as a result of alleged violations of the Truth in Lending
Act. Id. at 462-63. The La Mar court stated:
[The] danger exists in those situations in which the defendant by
reason of the legal relations involved can not as a practical matter
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als of a mass air disaster case seeking damages, a judg-
ment that the defendant was liable to one plaintiff would
not require action inconsistent with a judgment that he
was not liable to another plaintiff; the defendant would
simply have to compensate one of the plaintiffs and not
the other.29 Thus, certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
would be improper in a mass air disaster situation where
damages are sought because there is no risk of subjecting
the defendant to inconsistent obligations.
The second clause of the "prejudice" provisions, Rule
23(b)(1)(B), authorizes class actions when separate ac-
tions would inescapably alter the substance of the rights
of others having similar claims.30 Since the concept of
collateral estoppel does not apply to parties who have not
had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate their claims,31
mass accident plaintiffs will not usually be affected by un-
favorable judgments in previous suits. 32 Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
however, may be useful in situations where individual
judgments might practically impede the interests of other
potential class members in obtaining compensation.3 3
pursue two different courses of conduct .... Infrequently, if ever will
this be the case when the action is for money damages .... [The]
success [of the defendants] by its terms does not fix the rights and
duties owed by the defendants to others.
Id. at 466. The court then concluded that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) did not apply to this
situation. Id.
29 Comment, supra note 18, at 1620.
-- FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). In La Mar, the court noted: "[tihe focus of [Rule
23(b)(1)(B)] is upon the effect of an action on behalf of an individual on the inter-
ests of those who have rights similar to those of the individual bringing suit,
rather than on the danger of imposing incompatible standards of conduct on the
defendant." Id., 489 F.2d at 466-67.
41 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313 (1971), in which the Court reasoned:
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may
not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have
never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the
claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more
existing adjudications of the identical issue which stands squarely
against their position.
Id. at 329.
' See Comment, supra note 18, at 1620.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1155. For the exact language of FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(B), see supra note 15.
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For example, suppose a defendant has limited mone-
tary resources with which to satisfy an adverse judgment.
If the court permitted individual actions to proceed
against the defendant, the plaintiffs who sued first would
exhaust the defendant's resources, and subsequent plain-
tiffs would be left without a remedy. 4 In this type of
"limited fund" situation where either the defendant's re-
sources are limited or his liability is limited by statute,35
the satisfaction of earlier judgments will practically dis-
pose of the interests of other similarly situated plaintiffs
who were not parties to the earlier actions. Thus, certifi-
cation of a class action serves to assure a fair recovery for
all the class members when the defendant's resources are
limited. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) probably will not apply to com-
mercial mass air disaster litigation, however, since the de-
fendants in such cases are typically large national or
multinational corporations with access to substantial
resources.
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class action treatment only in
situations where "a party has taken or refused to take ac-
tion with respect to the class and the class seeks declara-
tory or injunctive relief against that party."' 36  Rule
23(b)(2) does not apply to cases, such as mass air disas-
ters, where final relief is sought mainly in the form of
monetary damages. 7 Rather, it applies to situations when
4 Comment, supra note 19, at 1199. The applicability of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) in
this type of situation was recognized by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of
the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect
on the interests of other members who should therefore be repre-
sented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the case when claims are made
by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.
A class action by or against representative members to settle the va-
lidity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate
proof of the amount of each valid claim and proportionate distribu-
tion of the fund, meets the problem.
FED. R. Civ, P. 23 advisory committee's note.
" See Comment, supra note 20, at 403; Hernandez, 61 F.R.D. at 558.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See supra note 15 for the text of Rule 23(b)(2).
-17 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note ("[t]he subdivision does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predom-
inately to money damages.").
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injunctive relief or declaratory relief on which injunctive
relief could be based is proper.3 8
Despite the opinion of the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee in the notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule
23 3 Rule 23(b)(3) seems to be the most appropriate sub-
section for certifying a class action in a mass aviation dis-
aster. In certifying a class action under Rule 23(b)(3),
several requirements must be fulfilled. First, common
questions of law or fact must predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members.40 In determining
whether the predomination requirement is fulfilled, most
courts use a pragmatic balancing approach, focusing on
whether common questions of law or fact represent a sub-
stantial part of the case and whether the claims of the
group desiring certification share a common nucleus of
operative facts.4' In mass accident cases where injuries
result from common causes, this approach is not fre-
quently challenged.4 2 Second, Rule 23(b)(3) requires the
court to determine whether other alternative methods of
s See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), where the Second Circuit stated: "[s]ubsection
(b)(2) was never intended to cover cases ... where the primary claim is for dam-
ages, but is only applicable where the relief sought is exclusively or predominately
injunctive or declaratory."
-, The committee stated:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordi-
narily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nomi-
nally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple law-
suits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
4o FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
41 See Comment, supra note 19, at 1211; see, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (court noted that although a complete
identity of issues was lacking, the circumstances concerning a conspiracy formed a
"common nucleus of operative facts" which constituted substantial questions of
law or fact common to all parties); Eisen, 391 F.2d at 565 (court noted the "com-
mon nucleus of operative facts" standard in holding that the predomination re-
quirement was fulfilled); Gabel, 350 F. Supp. at 629 (court relied on same set of
operative facts to certify class action of people suing as a result of an airplane
crash).
4 Comment, supra note 19, at 1211.
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adjudication would be superior to a class action. 3 Finally,
the court must weigh four factors in considering the pre-
domination and superiority prerequisites of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action.
The first factor that the court must consider is whether
other litigation has already been commenced and is pend-
ing.4 4 If a substantial number of actions are already pend-
ing prior to certification, the use of class action suits may
not avoid multiple litigation.4 5 In any event, the court
should determine the potential efficiency to be achieved
by the class action by comparing the number of suits actu-
ally pending to the size of the proposed class. 46 Because
pending litigation is only one factor to be considered in
the certification decision, a class action should not be de-
nied solely on this ground.
A second factor to be considered is the desirability of
concentrating the litigation in one particular forum.47 In
making this determination, the court should consider the
convenience to the parties and witnesses, the location of
relevant evidence, and the court's familiarity with the
case.48 In mass accident situations, it has been suggested
that the situs of the accident is the most logical forum be-
cause of the uniformity of the injuries inflicted on the
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). For a discussion of the superiority of various alter-
natives to class actions, see infra notes 96-130 and accompanying text.
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
4. Comment, supra note 19, at 1212; see also 3B J. MooRE, supra note 10
23.45[4.21, at 23-336. If the number of suits already commenced is substantial,
then the efficiencies achieved through the use of a class action would be minimal.
46 Comment, supra note 19, at 1212. In Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 392, the court held
that the existence of ten previously instituted suits was insignificant in comparison
to the estimated size of the class. The significance of other pending suits may be
further reduced if it is likely that the individuals in the previously commenced
action would join in the class action. Id.; see also Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. Methode Elec., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 724 (N.D. 11. 1968) (pending litiga-
tion was not a bar to class certification where 74 individual suits had already com-
menced and the estimated size of the class was in excess of 240 members).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
41 Comment, supra note 19, at 1213; see also 3B J. MooRE, supra note 10,





The third consideration for the court involves the po-
tential for difficulties in managing the class action. 50 Diffi-
culties surrounding the notification of class members, the
presence of individual issues, and general administrative
problems associated with large numbers of litigants are
inherent in any class action.5' The courts should always
balance these difficulties, however, with the benefits
gained from a class action.52 The final and perhaps most
substantial consideration involves determining the extent
of an individual's interest in controlling his own
litigation.53
III. JUDICIAL HESITANCY TO CERTIFY CLASS ACTIONS IN
MASS DISASTERS
The courts frequently cite four special problems in re-
fusing to certify class actions in mass accident situations:
(1) individualization of issues;5 4 (2) conflict of laws; 55
49 See Comment, supra note 19, at 1213; see also Comment, supra note 18, at
1637; Comment, Choice of Law in Mass Tort Litigation, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 203, 211
(1990).
,FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
s' Comment, supra note 19, at 1214. These problems are no more pervasive in
mass tort cases than in other areas where class actions have been certified. For
example, in Eisen, 391 F.2d at 555, the court certified a class of 3.75 million pur-
chasers and sellers of securities who had been harmed by the defendant's alleged
monopolization of the market, Id. at 570. This case illustrates that while classes
may become extremely large, class size alone should not prevent certification.
Furthermore, if the class action becomes unmanageable during the course of the
suit, Rule 23(c)(1) permits the court to dismiss the class action. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1). Thus, management difficulties should not stand as a barrier to
certification.
52 Obviously, as the class becomes larger the management problems increase.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa.
1968). The larger the class size, however, the greater are the benefits to be gained
from a common resolution of the issues. Id. As Professors Wright and Miller
have noted: "[ilronically, those Rule 23(b)(3) actions requiring the most manage-
ment may yield the greatest pay-off in terms of effective dispute resolution." C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10 § 1780, at 583.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). For a discussion of this consideration see infra
notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
S4 See, e.g., Yandle v. PPG Indus. Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (class
action certification denied in suit brought on behalf of 570 employees who were
exposed in varying degrees to asbestos dust over a ten year period). But see Dol-
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(3) collateral estoppel; 56 and (4) claimant's interest in in-
dividual control.
A. Individualization of Issues
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has suggested that class actions in mass acci-
dent cases are inappropriate because different damage
and liability issues exist with respect to each individual
plaintiff, and these differences severely limit a court's abil-
ity to make a uniform, class-wide resolution of such is-
sues.58  These differences should not preclude
maintenance of a class action, however, since the federal
rules provide that a class action may be limited to litiga-
tion of certain issues common to the class as a whole.5 9
gow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), in which the court noted:
"[t]he fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class may
remain after the common questions have been resolved does not dictate the con-
clusion that a class action is not permissible." Id.
,- See Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (class action certification was not appropriate in action brought in Vir-
ginia where the accident occured in Indonesia, only 17 of the 96 passengers were
Americans, and of the 17 American citizens, only plaintiff's two decedents were
residents of Virginia and the others were residents of several different states);
Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (air crash was
not appropriate for class action certification in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania where, other than the named plaintiffs, none of the potential class mem-
bers had any connection with Pennsylvania, and it was highly unlikely that any
eyewitnesses or even key expert witnesses would find the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania a convenient forum).
.' See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
(court found that it was "conceivable that the defendants would be taken to task
by one passenger after another until a judgment against the defendants was ob-
tained," and at that point, future plaintiffs could rely on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to bind the defendants on the issue of negligence), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
57 See Hobbs, 50 F.R.D. at 79, in which the court stated:
[I]t is clear that each claimant in this situation may properly be re-
garded as having a legitimate interest in litigating independently.
Not only do the claims vitally affect a significant aspect of the lives of
the claimants (unlike the usual class action, where individual claims
are somewhat peripheral to the lives of the claimants), but there is a
wide range of choice of the strategy and tactics of the litigation.
Id.
See supra note 39 for a precise statement of the committee's position on this
issue.
-51 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) provides that "an action may be brought or main-
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Thus, even when individual damage issues are present
with respect to each plaintiff in a mass aviation disaster
case, these issues may simply be reserved for individual
treatment, and the question of liability may be tried as a
class action.
In certain mass accident situations there will be "signifi-
cant questions relating to the issue of liability which affect
individuals in such different ways that as a practical matter
the class action will amount to nothing more than a set of
individual lawsuits." 60 In the typical mass aviation disas-
ter, however, the facts pertaining to liability will not differ
meaningfully from one individual to another and there is
little likelihood of any individual defenses to liability.6'
The liability of the defendant to each individual passenger
will depend upon precisely the same facts and circum-
stances, and the defendant will not have individual de-
fenses to any claims.62 One scholar has even suggested
that "the advisory committee's admonition against class
actions in mass accident situations 'seems strange,' be-
cause certain features of Rule 23, namely, the privilege of
exclusion and the provision that the action may be limited
to particular issues, look as if they were especially
designed to accommodate a mass accident. '63  Other
commentators also suggest that class actions are particu-
larly appropriate for disposing of a large number of cases
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues." Furthermore, it has
been commonly recognized that the necessity for calculation of damages on an
individual basis should not preclude certification of a class action when the com-
mon issues which determine liability predominate. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).
- Comment, supra note 20, at 388. In a mass accident situation where multiple
plaintiffs are injured in a series of incidents perpetrated by the same defendant, a
class action would not be appropriate because the circumstances surrounding the
liability of the defendant would differ as to each individual plaintiff. Id. at 388-89.
- Id. at 389.
62 Id.
' Id. See Comment, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Es-
toppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1010, 1044 (1967).
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arising out of a single disaster.64
B. Conflict of Laws
Since claimants in mass air disasters usually reside in a
number of different jurisdictions, choice of law rules pres-
ent some difficulties for federal courts in certifying class
actions. Even so, the obstacles presented by these differ-
ing state substantive laws may be overcome. The tradi-
tional choice of law rule with respect to tort claims has
been "the law of the place where an alleged tort was com-
mitted."' 65 In recent years, however, a number of states
have abandoned this traditional approach for a govern-
mental interest approach in which the courts give "con-
trolling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue
raised in the litigation. ' 66 Under this approach, a federal
court may be required to apply differing laws to different
class members in a multistate mass accident situation be-
cause applicable state law may differ on the issue of liabil-
- See, e.g., 3 H. NEWBURG, supra note 6, at 373. Several prominent scholars have
spoken in favor of using actions in mass accident litigation:
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules when Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an Advisory
Committee Note saying that mass torts are inappropriate for class
certification. I thought then that was true. I am profoundly con-
vinced now that it is untrue. Unless we can use the class action and
devices built on the class action, our judicial system is simply not
going to be able to cope with the challenge of the mass repetitive
wrong that we see in this case and so many others that have been
mentioned this morning and afternoon.
Id. (quoting Prof. Charles Alan Wright, In Re School Asbestos Litig., Master File
83-0268 (E.D. Pa.) Class Action Argument, July 30, 1984, Tr. 106); see also supra
note 10.
'- Comment, supra note 20, at 390; see also Comment, Choice of Law Issues in Mass
Tort Litigation, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 203 (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of
various choice of law rules.
,i Comment, supra note 20, at 390, quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); see also Gutierrez v. Collins, 583
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 391 So. 2d 808 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Southwell v. Widing Transp. Inc., 676 P.2d 477 (Wash.
1984).
ity.67 Some courts have cited this issue as an impediment
to certification of class actions.68
At first, the conflict of laws impediment may seem sub-
stantial; however, the problem may not even exist in cer-
tain situations. First, in forum states which follow the
traditional rule, that of applying the law of the state in
which the accident occurred, the same law will apply to
each class member and thus no impediment will exist.
Furthermore, other circumstances may reconcile the
traditional rule with the rationale of the modern govern-
mental interest rule, since the jurisdiction in which the ac-
cident occurred will arguably have the greatest interest in
the issue of liability due to its legitimate concern with the
regulation of conduct within its borders.69 Second, even
if the forum state follows the modern rule, no obstacles
exist where all of the victims reside in the same state, be-
cause the state's substantive law will apply equally to all
resident victims. 70  Third, if differences between the vari-
ous state standards of liability are immaterial, no
problems are presented.7 ' Finally, if substantial differ-
ences in the substantive law governing liability do exist,
the problem could be resolved by the use of special ver-
,67 State law, which ordinarily controls the resolution of substan-
tive issues [such as liability], may vary as to the use of certain de-
fenses, the burden of proof, the availability of certain theories of
recovery such as strict liability, and the use of certain doctrines
which ease the plaintiff's burden of proof or which help to overcome
certain affirmative defenses.
Comment, Federal Courts-Proposed Aircraft Crash Litigation Legislation, 35 Mo. L.
REV. 215, 216 (1970).
6. For a summary of such cases, see supra note 55.
lo See Comment, supra note 20, at 392; see also Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, in which the court held:
Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his
automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrong-
ful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclu-
sive concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of
the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest
in regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost un-
thinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place.
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
7) Comment, supra note 20, at 391.
71 Id.
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dicts or general verdicts accompanied by answers to
72interrogatories.
A number of scholars have even suggested the develop-
ment of a special federal common law to apply specifically
to mass air disasters.73 Creation of a new federal common
law rule would enable the courts to apply a single law in
deciding the issue of liability for all class members. Such
a unified application of the law would abolish the conflict
of laws impediment to the certification of class actions in
mass air disasters, and would promote the overall policy
objective of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: efficient and
just adjudication. 74 Thus, with some judicial and legisla-
tive creativity, the conflict of laws problem should not
stand as an insurmountable barrier to the certification of
class actions in mass air disaster litigation.
C. Collateral Estoppel
The traditional collateral estoppel rule provides that a
party may not assert a judgment as conclusive on a partic-
ular issue against a nonparty to the action unless the non-
party would be able to assert it against the party.75 In
recent years, many jurisdictions have abandoned the doc-
trine of mutuality of estoppel, creating the possibility of
the offensive use of collateral estoppel against parties to
72 Comment, supra note 18, at 1623, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 49; cf Farrell v. Ameri-
can Flyers Airline Corp., 42 F.R.D. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court suggested the
use of special verdicts when plaintiffs advance slightly different theories of recov-
ery in consolidated airline crash cases).
7.1 See, e.g., Comment, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law
Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077 (1987); see also Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort
Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Comment, supra
note 67, at 215; Tydings, supra note 3, at 299; Hailer, Death in the Air: Federal
Regulation of Tort Liability a Must, 54 A.B.A. J. 382 (1968).
74 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 states:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts
in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in
equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.
Id. (emphasis added).
1. Comment, supra note 20, at 393.
an action.76 Some commentators herald the possibility of
offensive use of the collateral estoppel doctrine as an an-
swer to redundant trials in mass accident cases. 77 The of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel, however, inhibits the
desirability of a class action for mass accident plaintiffs be-
cause of the "opt out" provision of Rule 23(c)(2)(A).7 a
Under this provision, class members may avoid being
bound by an adverse judgment against the class by simply
excluding themselves from the action.79 The availability
of this "opt out" provision in conjunction with the doc-
trine of offensive collateral estoppel encourages plaintiffs
to take a wait-and-see attitude, knowing that they may take
advantage of another plaintiff's favorable judgment while
ignoring any adverse judgments.8 ° Since this "opt out"
provision tends to discourage plaintiffs from participating
in class actions, at least one scholar has suggested that
members who opt out should be denied the offensive use
of any favorable judgment in the class action.8'
An alternative solution to this problem would be to
amend Rule 23 to allow the court to preclude plaintiffs
76 Id.
7 See, e.g., Comment, Collateral Estoppel-Choice of Laws-A New Approach to Multi-
Passenger Accident Litigation, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 289 (1969); Wocott, Collateral Es-
toppel and Other Practical Approaches to Commercial Air Crash Claims, 13 N.Y.L.F. 509,
(1967).
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from
the class if the member so requests by a specific date....
Id.
79 Id.
go Comment, supra note 18, at 1628.
"8 See 3 H. NEWBURG, supra note 6, at 432. If plaintiff could have joined in the
first action, but instead chose to "wait and see" how the first suit turned out, the
court should consider denying the use of offensive collateral estoppel. Id. See also
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) where the Court stated:
"[tihe general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have
joined in the earlier action or where . . . the application of offensive [collateral]
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of
offensive collateral estoppel." Id. at 331.
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from opting out under those circumstances which would
foster such wait-and-see attitudes. In any event, in the in-
terest of fairness to the class, "opt out" plaintiffs should
be prevented from taking advantage of opportunities
which were unavailable to the class members during the
class actions.
D. Interest in Individual Control
A claimant's interest in individual control over his or
her lawsuit in a mass accident situation is frequently cited
as an impediment to certification of a class action.82
Claims in mass aviation disasters often involve severe in-
jury or death and huge monetary claims. Furthermore,
the plaintiffs usually place great psychological and emo-
tional emphasis on individually vindicating their claims
against the responsible parties.8 3 Thus, individual inter-
est in controlling the strategic and tactical direction of the
lawsuit may be great.8 4 For example, since significant dif-
ferences in jury awards for particular injuries are per-
ceived to exist among judicial districts, individual
plaintiffs will likely attempt to file their claims in "the
most convenient, high award district that the applicable
venue and jurisdictional rules permit. '8 5 If the plaintiffs
82 See, e.g., Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(class action inappropriate for wrongful death actions arising out of a bus acci-
dent), aff'don other grounds, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 946
(1974); Hobbs, 50 F.R.D. at 80 (class action inappropriate where airplane crash
resulted in multiple deaths); Causey, 66 F.R.D. at 399 (class actions inappropriate
for wrongful death actions arising from an airplane crash).
8. Trangsrud,Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Ligitation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779,
820 (1985). "The importance of a family's control over its claim for the wrongful
death of its sole provider, for example, cannot be gainsaid." Id.
'' Comment, supra note 20, at 397; see also Hobbs, 50 F.R.D. at 79 in which the
court states:
[I]t is clear that each claimant in this situation may properly be re-
garded as having a legitimate interest in litigating independently.
Not only do the claims vitally affect a significant aspect of the lives of
the claimants (unlike the usual class action, where individual claims
are somewhat peripheral to the lives of the claimants), but there is a
wide range of choice of the strategy and tactics of the litigation.
Id.
"5 Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 820.
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request a class action however, the court would decide the
proper forum for the trial, usually basing its choice upon
considerations of convenience to the parties and wit-
nesses, and/or the situs of the accident.8 6 If a class action
is certified, the individual plaintiff may find the state law
applied by the forum court to be less favorable than the
law of the forum that he otherwise might have selected.
The representative parties in a class action may also de-
cide to proceed on liability theories that are better suited
for class treatment at the expense of theories that would
be more favorable to individual plaintiffs.88 Furthermore,
class counsel must proceed based upon an estimation of
the interests of the class as a whole, rather than consider-
ing the interests of individual plaintiffs, because no inter-
nal procedures exist by which a class can make these types
of decisions.89 Conflicts between lawyers and the class
members can, however, usually be kept to a minimum by
intensive judicial scrutiny of the conduct of the
litigation.90
Despite these limitations, one commentator has sug-
gested that the courts should try to "balance the interest
in individual control against the interest in conserving ju-
dicial resources and reducing costs for litigants." 9 ' In
weighing these interests, the courts should consider the
costs and benefits of a class action to all parties of the liti-
gation.92 The courts should not necessarily assume that
class members would overlook the time, effort, and cost
benefits of a class action determination of liability simply
-" Id. at 821.
H Id.
sm Id.; see, e.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (1970).
- Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 822.
1H McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Court of Appeals affirmed district court's denial of class certification due to the
lack of competency displayed by the attorney for the proposed class. The attorney
made no attempt at discovery, and thus failed to adequately prepare for trial on
behalf of the class).
") Comment, supra note 20, at 399.
sw See generally 3 H. NEWBURG, supra note 6, at 367; see also Trangsrud, note 83 at
781-83.
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because their claims are substantial. 93 Class members
may, in fact, be willing to sacrifice their individual control
in order to gain the advantages provided by a class ac-
tion.94 For those class members who insist on exercising
individual control over their suits, the "opt out" provision
of Rule 23(c)(2)(A) allows them to exclude themselves
from the class. If it can be determined beforehand, how-
ever, that a significant number of class members would
utilize the "opt out" provision, the court would then be
correct in refusing to certify a class action because certifi-
cation would amount to "an exercise in futility.' 95
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO CLASS ACTIONS IN MASS
DISASTERS
In order to certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), a
court must first determine if a class action is "superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. '9 6 As one commentator has ob-
served, "[a] major reason for the parsimonious use of the
class action [suit] in personal injury tort cases has been a
judicial tradition approving alternative procedures. ' 9 7 Al-
ternative methods of adjudication which have been used
by the courts in mass accident situations include: (1) join-
der of claims; 98 (2) transfer and consolidation;99 (3) trans-
fer for coordinated pretrial; 00 and (4) use of a test case.'
As will be shown, however, these alternative methods of
adjudication are not necessarily superior to class actions.
11-1 Comment, supra note 20, at 399.
94 Id.
s'i See Causey, 66 F.R.D. at 399 ("[I]t might well prove to be an exercise in futility
were the Court to declare a class action and later learn that most or all of the class
members had chosen to opt out of this class action.").
w See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
"7 See 3 H. NEWBURG, supra note 6, at 364 (quoting from Note, Class Action-Mass
Accident Litigation, 40J. AIR L. & COM. 320, 322 (1974)).
See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
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A. Joinder of Claims
The impracticability of joinder is a prerequisite to the
certification of all class actions under Rule 23.102 Thus, if
joinder of claims would be practical, a class action would
not be necessary. In a typical mass aviation accident in-
volving hundreds of people, the claimants will likely re-
side throughout the country and joinder would be
impractical. In deciding whether or notjoinder is imprac-
tical for purposes of certifying a class action, a showing of
impossibility is not required. Instead, a showing of diffi-
culty or inconvenience often suffices.11 3 Since mass avia-
tion disasters will usually involve over one hundred
potential plaintiffs, joinder will not be a suitable method
for the adjudication of these claims."°4
B. Transfer and Consolidation
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows for a joint
trial or consolidation of any or all issues in actions involv-
ing common questions of law or fact. 10 5 Mass accidents
usually involve common questions of law or fact. Conse-
quently, they are often consolidated for trial in federal
court. 10 6 Claims in mass accident cases, however, are
often brought in several different districts. Therefore, it
is first necessary to transfer them to the same district
before the claims may be consolidated. Section 1404(a) of
Title 28, United States Code, provides the means for such
a transfer.10 7 Since section 1404(a) requires the unani-
mous cooperation of all transferor judges, a transfer
102 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1762, at 159.
' See Comment, supra note 18, at 1624.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
1"i Comment, supra note 18, at 1624-25.
,,7 Section 1404(a) provides: "[F]or the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
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under this section may be difficult to achieve.'0 8 Assum-
ing that the transferor judges do in fact cooperate, trans-
fer and consolidation may be a workable alternative to
class actions in a mass disaster context; however, class ac-
tions still serve as a superior method of binding cases to-
gether for trial.
First, class actions can consolidate all claims arising
from a mass accident (except for those plaintiffs who
choose to opt out) and bind them with a final adjudication
on the merits. On the other hand, a Rule 42(a) consolida-
tion merely provides for a joint trial which is binding only
on those claimants who are present for trial.' 09 Second,
section 1404(a) specifically limits transfers to districts
where the action "might have been brought" initially." 0
If the proposed transferee district lacks subject matter ju-
risdiction over the defendant, or if venue would be im-
proper there, the court will deny the transfer.' This may
be a formidable limitation; it implies that consolidation,
even in conjunction with a section 1404(a) transfer, may
not enable combination and disposition of all the litiga-
tion resulting from some mass accidents." 2 In a class ac-
tion, by contrast, only the named plaintiffs (representative
parties) are relevant for venue and subject matter jurisdic-
tion purposes.1 3 Careful choice of representative parties
may prevent venue and subject matter jurisdiction
district or division where it might have been brought .... 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1988).
'" Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 803.
Comment, supra note 18, at 1625.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Comment, supra note 18, at 1625-26 (citing Comment, The Search for the Most
Convenient Federal Forum: Three Solutions to the Problems of Multidistrict Litigation, 64
Nw. U.L. REV. 188, 192 (1969)).
1"2 Comment, supra note 18, at 1626. However, the comment notes that this
limitation "may be mitigated by the fact that all the mass accident claims could be
brought in the district where the 'claim arose', . . . and thus there would always be
at least one district in which all claims could be consolidated." Id. at n.74. Fur-
thermore, it is suggested that in a mass aviation accident, the defendants would
most likely be national or multinational corporations which could be subject to
suit in any of several districts. Id.
11. Comment, supra note 18, at 1626.
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problems. Finally, section 1404(a) provides no efficient
coordination procedures which can ensure that all related
cases are transferred to a single court." 4  In the absence
of such coordination procedures, litigants are often una-
ware of related actions in other districts until their own
cases are well developed, thereby causing needless dupli-
cation of effort." 5 By contrast, the required notice to all
class members under Rule 23(d)(2)" 6 assures that all po-
tential plaintiffs would at least be informed of a class ac-
tion and thus might be dissuaded from bringing their own
suits." 7  Because of this greater power to consolidate,
bind, and dispense with all claims in one action and ap-
peal, the class action is superior to consolidation and
transfer in the litigation of claims arising from mass avia-
tion accidents." 18
C. Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial
Section 1407 of Title 28, United States Code, provides
for the transfer and consolidation of actions whenever
(1) "civil actions involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact are pending in different districts," (2) the
transfer of these actions will promote the just and efficient
conduct of these individual suits, and (3) the transfer will
be convenient to the parties and the witnesses. 9 Section
114 Id.
1- Id. (citing Multidistrict Litigation Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1966)).
-1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). The entire rule is quoted supra note 15.
,,7 Comment, supra note 18, at 1626.
l- Id.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determina-
tion that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient con-
duct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded
by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings
to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
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1407 has proven to be a popular alternative to mass avia-
tion accident class actions.1 2 1 Section 1407, however,
contains an important and obvious shortcoming often
overlooked by courts and commentators.' 2' Both the lan-
guage of section 1407 and the legislative history confirm
that the transferee court should maintain transferred
cases only for pretrial purposes. 2 2 Following pretrial, the
cases must be remanded back to the transferor court for
trial. 23 In order to circumvent this requirement, courts
consistently hold that a transferee court may transfer the
case to itself for trial pursuant to section 1404(a),124 as-
serting that this practice is consistent with both the text of
section 1407 and its legislative history as well.' 2 5 Thus, as
previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may sepa-
rate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and
remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is
remanded.
Id. § 1407(a).
For examples of transfers made in mass aviation disaster cases, see In re Air
Disaster at Denver, Colo., on Nov. 16, 1976, 486 F. Supp. 241 (1980); In re Air
Crash Near Van Cleve, Miss., on Aug. 13, 1977, 486 F. Supp. 926 (1980); In re Air
Crash at Schenley Golf Course, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Aug. 21, 1977, 510 F. Supp.
1228 (1979); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Santa Cruz Airport, Bombay, India, on
Jan. 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158 (1979); In re Air Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport in
Denver, Colo., on Aug. 7, 1975, 447 F. Supp. 1071 (1978); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Taipei Int'l Airport on July 31, 1975, 433 F. Supp. 1120 (1977); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on Mar. 27, 1977, 435 F. Supp. 927 (1977);
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Natchitoches Parish, La., on Sept. 20, 1973, 407 F.
Supp. 1401 (1976); In re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on Sept. 8, 1974, 407
F. Supp. 238 (1974).
120 See Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 803; see generally Note, The Judicial Panel and
the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1002-17 (1974).
12 See Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 804.
122 Congress has expressly stated that "subsection [1407(a)] requires that trans-
ferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated
pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the
consolidated proceedings." H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968);
see generally S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
2- Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 804. Section 1407(a) provides: "[E]ach action
so transferred shall be remanded by the [judicial] panel at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred .... 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
24 See supra note 107 for the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
125 Two appellate courts and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation have
approved the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) by a transferee judge to retain a case for
trial. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20 (3d Cir.
one commentator concludes, "it seems clear that the
lower federal courts have done by judicial fiat what Con-
gress refused to do by statute in 1969: [they have
amended] Section 1407 to allow transfers for trial as well
as pretrial purposes."'12 6 Since Congress has never em-
powered the judicial panel or transferee judges with the
authority to order joint trials in the transferee forum,
transferee courts should not allow this practice to con-
tinue in mass disaster cases. When section 1407 transfers
are properly limited to the purpose of dispensing with
pretrial matters, a class action will emerge as a superior
method of adjudicating mass air disaster claims because it
will provide for a just and efficient trial on the issue of
liability in one convenient forum.
D. Use of Test Cases
Test case agreements are simply "private, consensual
class action[s] [that are] enforceable between the par-
ties." 27 For example, in a mass accident situation where
many people are harmed by a single event, the parties
may agree to expedite the litigation by trying only one
claim on the issue of liability. 28 A test case plaintiff would
serve as a representative of the class of similarly situated
persons who agree to be bound by the judgment. The
decision in the test case creates a precedent which lays the
groundwork for future collateral estoppel.12 9
Prior to the 1966 amendments to the federal rules
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25
(2d Cir. 1971); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litig., 424 F.
Supp. 504, 507 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have noted the
use of § 1404(a) by transferee courts but have not decided whether such use is
proper. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d
1006, 1009 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400,
402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
,' ' Trangsrud, supra note 83, at 809.
'7 Comment, supra note 18, at 1630.
129 See id.; see also Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir.)
(test case to try issues of liability and right to indemnity in air crash matter), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
121, Rubin, supra note 3, at 440.
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which provided for class actions, a test case was the only
means of binding a class of accident victims in a single
representative suit. 130 With the advent of Rule 23, how-
ever, formal class actions proved superior to test cases be-
cause they required certain safeguards which were now
articulated in a federal rule: mandatory notice to all par-
ties affected, court supervision of any settlement, and a
growing body of interpretive precedent on proper use of
such actions.
V. CONCLUSION
A fundamental aspect of our judicial system is parity of
treatment. Persons in similar situations with similar
causes of action should be treated alike. Plaintiffs in mass
aviation disasters should be no exception to this general
rule. The plaintiffs, who are often numerous and geo-
graphically dispersed, can hardly expect consistent treat-
ment to flow from the traditional model of litigation
which has evolved to settle disputes between a single
plaintiff and defendant.' 3 '
In mass aviation disasters, where all the alleged injuries
arise from a common nucleus of operative facts, the court
should be willing to certify a class action on behalf of all
plaintiffs similarly situated. As Professors Wright, Miller
and Kane have noted: "When common questions repre-
sent a significant aspect of the case and they can be re-
solved for all members of the class in a single
adjudication, there is a clear justification for handling the
dispute on a representative [class basis] rather than on an
individual basis." 132
The economies of a class action will benefit all parties in
mass aviation disaster litigation. Plaintiffs would benefit
1-o Cf Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, Ill F. Supp. 80, 90 (D.N.J. 1953)
(spurious class action does not bind class members not before the court).
'.1 See Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979). But see
Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) (court decertified
class action due to problems of establishing liability); Mertens v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983).
"-1 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 10, § 1778, at 528.
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by having access to greater resources than they normally
would have in an individual suit. They would be entitled
to broader and more effective discovery which would al-
low them to pursue litigation on an equal footing with the
defendant. Plaintiffs would also benefit by presenting an
"organized front" against the large corporate defendants
which are typical of mass aviation disaster litigation.
Conversely, defendants would be spared the effort of
having to respond to the multitude of duplicative plead-
ings and motions presented by individual suits. They
would also be able to develop a clearer estimate of their
own economic exposure for settlement purposes, and if a
settlement could not be reached, at least they would be
faced with only one major suit, as opposed to a plethora
of individual suits.
Finally, the already overburdened judicial system would
benefit from the use of class actions in mass aviation dis-
aster litigation. A consolidation of the plaintiffs' claims
into a single proceeding would serve to reduce the tre-
mendous amount of time, energy and expense involved in
a series of identical individual suits. Thus, the present ju-
dicial hesitance surrounding the use of class actions
should be abandoned in favor of a more open-minded ap-
proach that recognizes the advantages of class actions as
both effective and efficient tools in the adjudication of
claims arising from mass aviation disasters.
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